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In a simple model of endogenous growth with spending by different levels of
government, we demonstrate how ﬁscal decentralization affects the long-run growth
rate of the economy. Applying the model to the U.S. economy, we ﬁnd that the
existing spending shares for state and local governments have been consistent with
growth maximization. In this sense, further decentralization in public spending may
be harmful for growth. © 1999 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
Fiscal decentralization, the devolution of ﬁscal responsibilities of the fed-
eral government to state and local governments, is seen as a means to en-
hance the efﬁciency of the government and promote economic development
and growth. This argument is clearly stated by Oates [13]:
The basic economic case for ﬁscal decentralization is the enhancement of eco-
nomic efﬁciency: the provision of local outputs that are differentiated according
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to local tastes and circumstances results in higher levels of social welfare than
centrally determined and more uniform levels of outputs across all jurisdictions.
Although this proposition has been developed mainly in a static context (see my
treatment of the Decentralization Theorem, Oates [11]), the thrust of the argu-
ment should also have some validity in a dynamic setting of economic growth.
There surely are strong reasons, in principle, to believe that policies formulated
for the provision of infrastructure and even human capital that are sensitive to re-
gional or local conditions are likely to be more effective in encouraging economic
development than centrally determined policies that ignore these geographical
differences.
This argument has been supported by many experts on ﬁscal federalism
and local government ﬁnance (Rivlin [15]; Bird [3]; Gramlich [8]; Sylla,
Wallis, and Legler [16]). In practice, most developing countries have been
decentralizing public spending and revenue collection from central gov-
ernments to local governments (Dillinger [7]), whereas many developed
economies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada are
reviving debates on ﬁscal decentralization or devolution. The case is espe-
cially pertinent for the United States. In recent years, the U.S. Congress
has been contemplating eliminating hundreds of federal programs, replac-
ing some with block grants to state and local governments, and ending the
so-called unfunded federal mandates.
However, it is surprising that the few existing empirical studies have been
unsuccessful in their efforts to substantiate the potential contribution of
ﬁscal decentralization to economic growth and development. Davoodi and
Zou [5], and Zhang and Zou [17] have taken a ﬁrst step toward quantifying
the growth effects of ﬁscal decentralization and aggregate public spending
by different levels of government. So far they have only found a negative
association between output growth and ﬁscal decentralization in their cross-
country study, as well as a country case study on China.
In this paper we set up a general analytical model linking ﬁscal decen-
tralization to economic growth and then apply our analytical framework
to the U.S. economy over the past four decades to test the signiﬁcance of
efﬁciency gains from ﬁscal decentralization.
2. A GROWTH MODEL WITH DIFFERENT LEVELS OF
GOVERNMENT SPENDING
Following Barro [2], Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou [6], and Davoodi and
Zou [5], the endogenous growth model consists of a production function
with two inputs: private capital and public spending, where the function
exhibits constant returns to scale in the two inputs. We depart from Barro’s
model by assuming that public spending is carried out by three levels of
government: federal, state, and local. Let k be private capital stock, g the
consolidated government spending, f federal government spending, s state230 xie, zou, davoodi
government spending, and l local government spending:
f C s C l D g: (1)
The production function is CES:
y D

k C f  C γs C !l1=
; −1 <<1; (2)
where , , γ, and ! are all in 0;1 and  C  C γ C ! D 1. The CES
production function includes the Cobb–Douglas speciﬁcation in Davoodi
and Zou [5] as a special case  D 0. The introduction of public spending
by different levels of government creates a potentially positive link between
ﬁscal decentralization (i.e., differential effects of spending by three levels of
government) and growth. As in Barro [2], when specifying the production
function, we do not consider human capital and labor, but allow for these
inputs in the empirical work.
The consolidated government spending g is ﬁnanced by a ﬂat output tax
at rate :
g D y: (3)
To derive the long-run growth rate of the economy, we ﬁrst analyze the
decisions made by the private sector. We consider a long-lived representa-









where c is consumption of a single good produced in this economy;  is
the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution; and  is the rate
of time preference. An overlapping-generations model addressing similar
issues is presented by Brueckner [4].
The dynamic budget constraint he faces is:
P k D 1 − 

k C f  C γs C !l1= − c; k0 given. (5)
The representative individual takes as given the government’s announce-
ment of the ﬁxed tax rate ; and spending at different levels of governments,
f, s; and l. He then chooses optimally the consumption path ctxt  0
and the path of the capital stock ktxt  0. To characterize the indi-
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The ﬁrst-order conditions are given by
c− D ; (7)
P  D  − 1 − 

k C f  C γs C !l1−=k−1: (8)
The transversality condition is ke−t ! 0a st approaches inﬁnity.
Equations (5), (7), and (8) together with the initial condition and the
transversality condition determine the representative individual’s optimal
responses. One immediate result from these equations is that the growth







where x denotes the vector k;f;s;l;; rx has the interpretation of the
real interest rate and is deﬁned by
rxD1 − 

k C f  C γs C !l1−=k−1: (10)
Let us deﬁne the spending shares for the federal, state, and local gov-











Then, substituting (10) and (11) into (9), we obtain the long-run growth
rate, G, of the economy explicitly as a function of various spending shares,


















Thus the allocation of public spending among different levels of gov-
ernment can affect economic growth as seen from Eq. (12). To examine
how the long-run growth rate responds to various spending shares and in-
come tax rates, we assume that the government’s objective is to maximize
the growth rate in (12) by choosing , 'f, 's; and 'l. This is the same
as maximizing the individual’s consumption growth (which coincides with
the rate of growth of output and capital) in (9) subject to the government
budget constraint of (3). Hence the problem can be formulated as one of
maximizing (12) subject to
f C s C l  

k C f  C γs C !l1=: (13)
The growth-maximizing tax rate is given in the following equation:
1−
 C 1 − 
D 51−; (14)
where 5 D 1=1− C γ1=1− C !1=1−.232 xie, zou, davoodi
The growth-maximizing shares of federal, state, and local government
















Here we can interpret 1=1−, γ1=1−; and !1=1− as measures of indi-
vidual productivity of public spending by the federal, state, and local gov-
ernments, respectively. In the same light, 5 D 1=1− Cγ1=1− C!1=1−
represents the aggregate productivity of all levels of government spending.
From Eqs. (15) to (17), it is apparent that the growth-maximizing spending
shares are equal to the ratios of individual productivity over the aggre-
gate productivity. If the actual spending shares do not correspond to these
growth-maximizing shares, some reallocation of resources among the three
levels of government will be growth-enhancing.
This point can be made most clearly in the case of the Cobb–Douglas
production function. With the Cobb–Douglas technology,  D 0. Then, the
growth-maximizing tax rate given by Eq. (14) is very simple:
 D  C γ C !; (18)
which is the same as the formula in Barro [2] after making the notation
consistent. 5 is simply equal to Cγ C!. The growth-maximizing shares
of federal, state, and local government spending are also very simple as in














 C γ C !
: (21)
It should be noted that we have focused on growth-maximizing spending
shares and income taxation. Quite naturally, we may raise the issue that
the government may maximize society’s welfare. In general, growth maxi-
mization and welfare maximization lead to different tax rates and different
spending shares for the three levels of government. However, if the pro-
duction function is Cobb–Douglas, these two kinds of maximization yield
the same solutions.1
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3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
To test the impact of ﬁscal decentralization on growth, we use annual his-
torical time series for the U.S. economy from 1948 to 1994. Following the
public ﬁnance literature (e.g., Oates [12]) we measure ﬁscal decentralization
as the share of spending by each level of government in consolidated gov-
ernment spending across all levels. A ceteris paribus rise in, say, the share
of the federal government, indicates a lower degree of ﬁscal decentraliza-
tion whereas a ceteris paribus rise in local government’s share indicates a
higher degree of ﬁscal decentralization.
Figure 1 plots these shares for three levels of government over the 1948–
94 period. The share of state spending rose steadily from 15 to 30% over
the 47 years, whereas local spending share ﬂuctuated between 20 and 30%
during the same period. The federal spending share declined from 63% in
the early 1950s to 43% in 1994. In calculating these spending shares, federal
grants to lower levels of government are not counted as federal spending.
At the same time, state spending includes the net grants received, which is
deﬁned as total grants received by state governments minus state transfers
to local governments. Similarly, local spending includes all grants received.
In our theoretical analysis, the growth equation (12) expresses the growth
rate of the economy as a function of the shares of government spending
FIG. 1. Fiscal decentralization 1948–1994.234 xie, zou, davoodi
at different levels and the tax rate. Our estimated equation below can be
thought of as a linear approximation of our nonlinear growth equation:
1yt D x0
t C ut (22)
where 1 is the difference operator, i.e., 1yt D yt − yt−1, yt is the logarithm
of per capita output; hence 1yt represents per capita output growth rate; xt
consists of shares of government spending at different levels (measures of
ﬁscal decentralization), the tax rate, and other determinants of growth;  is
the vector of parameters to be estimated; and ut is a disturbance term which
may be serially correlated and/or correlated with some elements of xt.
The detailed speciﬁcation of variables in Eq. (22) is as follows. Per capita
output is measured by real per capita gross domestic product (GDP). We
use our theoretical model as a guide to measure the tax rate and the shares
of government spending at different levels. Accordingly, the tax rate  is de-
ﬁned as the ratio of the total consolidated receipts of government (i.e., net
of intergovernmental grants) to GDP. It is therefore a measure of the aver-
age tax rate. In the previous section we already explained the construction
of shares of government spending by different levels of government. These
shares correspond to 'f, 's; and 'l in our theoretical model. Please note
that these shares may be a function of the rate of economic growth. But
in this exploratory study we ﬁnd it difﬁcult to choose a good set of instru-
ments to correct for this potential endogeneity of the spending shares. In
reality, these spending shares are not only related to economic growth; they
are also a product of political, institutional, and historical processes shap-
ing the assignments of taxes and expenditures among the federal, state,
and local governments. Hence, to offer a reasonable explanation for these
spending shares amounts to studying how ﬁscal decentralization itself is
determined, which shall be an important topic for further research.
In our empirical estimation, we also include a few other variables to test
the robustness of our basic tax and spending share variables as the determi-
nants of growth. These are the size of the labor force, the investment rate,
a measure of external shock, two measures of the openness of the econ-
omy, the inﬂation rate, and a measure of income distribution (the Gini
coefﬁcient).
The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ measure of the labor force, adjusted for
different education levels of the working population, represents our candi-
date variable for labor quality or the stock of human capital. We refer to
this variable as the labor quality index or labor. Gross private investment in
ﬁxed assets, as deﬁned in the National Income and Product Accounts of the
United States (NIPA), is used as a measure of private investment in physical
capital.
A price index of energy products is used as a measure of external shocks.
Energy price shocks have always been cited as causes of growth slowdownﬁscal decentralization and the economy in the u.s. 235
in the United States and other industrialized countries; see, among others,
Hamilton [9]. We use the average tariff rate as one measure of the openness
of the economy. It is deﬁned as the ratio of total customs duties to total
imports for consumption. A higher tariff rate indicates a less open economy.
Alternatively, we use the ratio of foreign trade volume over GDP as another
measure of openness as in many empirical studies on economic growth;
see Levine and Renelt [10]. In addition, we include the inﬂation rate and
income distribution as two other control variables to test the robustness of
our regression analysis; see Levine and Renelt [10]; Alesina and Rodrik [1];
and Persson and Tabellini [14].
We estimate the growth regression equation (22) using the technique
of the ordinary least squares (OLS). The results are reported in Tables 1
and 2.
Table 1 shows our results for three levels of government. Since spend-
ing shares for three levels of government add up to unity, we only include
two shares in the regression. For the three-level case, we include local and
state spending shares, where the local level represents the lowest layer of
the government. In Table 1 local spending share has a negative coefﬁcient
most of the time (six out of eight regressions), suggesting that higher ﬁscal
decentralization may be associated with lower growth. But the t-statistics
for the estimates are not very signiﬁcant. In addition, the state spending
share has a positive, but insigniﬁcant, coefﬁcient for all eight regressions.
On the basis of our theoretical, growth-maximizing model it is expected that
a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on one of the government-share vari-
ables indicates that this level of government is relatively too large, whereas
a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient suggests that this level of government
is relatively too small. Therefore, the insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients on local and
state spending shares may imply that the existing spending shares for local
and state governments have been consistent with growth maximization.2 In
this sense, further decentralization in public spending may be harmful for
growth.
For other control variables in Table 1, the estimated coefﬁcients are
broadly consistent with other empirical studies on economic growth: higher
growth is associated with lower energy prices, income inequality, tariff rate,
inﬂation rate, tax rate and a higher investment rate, and more foreign trade.
Table 2 reports the OLS estimations of the growth regression for two
levels of government for the same set of conditioning variables as in
2We should also acknowledge the alternate possibility that our model is incorrect and that
the effects of public spending by different levels of government in the production function of
Eq. (2) are the same. That is to say, output depends only on aggregate government spending
g and not on the separate spending levels: f; s; and l. In this case, the spending shares are
irrelevant to growth and should have no effect.236 xie, zou, davoodi
TABLE 1
Dependent Variable: Per Capita Output Growth Rate (Three Levels of Government)
Estimation OLS(1) OLS(2) OLS(3) OLS(4) OLS(5) OLS(6) OLS(7) OLS(8)
technique 1951– 1951– 1958– 1958– 1958– 1958– 1949– 1949–
period 1992 1991 1994 1991 1992 1991 1994 1991
Constant 0.05 0.01 0.30 0.24 0.33 0.27 0.07 0.05
(0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.11) (0.10)
[0.41] [0.10] [2.09] [1.59] [2.23] [1.80] [0.65] [0.54]
Average tax −0.15 −0.03 −0.67 −0.53 −0.72 −0.60 −0.22 −0.18
rate (0.40) (0.39) (0.41) (0.45) (0.43) (0.45) (0.38) (0.37)
[−0.37] [−0.07] [−1.64] [−1.17] [−1.65] [−1.32] [−0.58] [−0.49]
State government 0.04 0.07 0.44 0.37 0.54 0.47 0.15 0.25
spending share (0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.52) (0.49) (0.52) (0.34) (0.36)
[0.09] [0.18] [1.04] [0.71] [1.10] [0.89] [0.45] [0.71]
Local government 0.06 0.04 −0.77 −0.64 −0.91 −0.77 −0.06 −0.12
spending share (0.43) (0.42) (0.51) (0.55) (0.54) (0.55) (0.36) (0.35)
[0.14] [0.10] [−1.51] [−1.16] [−1.69] [−1.38] [−0.17] [−0.34]
Labor growth −0.07 0.07 0.55 0.74 0.52 0.65 −0.06 −0.06
rate (0.58) (0.56) (0.65) (0.69) (0.67) (0.67) (0.53) (0.53)
[−0.12] [0.13] [0.84] [1.07] [0.77] [0.96] [−0.11] [−0.12]
D(Log(Private 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.12
physical capital (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
investment)) [3.74] [3.61] [3.25] [2.94] [2.90] [2.86] [4.74] [4.72]
D(Openness) 0.52 0.15 0.99 0.59
(0.44) (0.45) (0.50) (0.56)
[1.16] [0.32] [1.95] [1.05]
D(Average tariff −1.57 −0.61 −1.23 −0.68
rate) (1.14) (1.26) (0.96) (0.96)
[−1.37] [−0.48] [−1.27] [−0.71]
Inﬂation rate −0.49 −0.50 −0.44 −0.49
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
[−3.10] [−3.41] [−2.99] [−3.42]
D(Log(Price −0.12 −0.11 −0.14 −0.13
of energy)) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
[−2.13] [−2.07] [−2.45] [−2.30]
D(Gini) −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
[−2.43] [−1.89] [−1.62] [−2.75]
Adjusted 0.40 0.47 0.37 0.41 0.40 0.43 0.45 0.53
R-squared
Number of 42 41 37 34 35 34 46 43
observations
Notes: Dxt D xt-xt−1. Standard errors and t-statistics are given in parentheses and brackets
respectively. OLSDordinary least squares.ﬁscal decentralization and the economy in the u.s. 237
TABLE 2
Dependent Variable: Per Capita Output Growth Rate (Two Levels of Government)
Estimation OLS(1) OLS(2) OLS(3) OLS(4) OLS(5) OLS(6) OLS(7) OLS(8)
technique 1951– 1951– 1958– 1958– 1958– 1958– 1949– 1949–
period 1992 1991 1994 1991 1992 1991 1994 1991
Constant 0.05 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
[1.32] [0.18] [1.72] [1.36] [1.77] [1.44] [1.15] [0.04]
Average tax −0.15 −0.01 −0.19 −0.13 −0.16 −0.12 −0.11 −0.01
rate (0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.247) (0.19) (0.19)
[−0.74] [−0.01] [−0.79] [−0.55] [−0.64] [−0.51] [−0.58] [−0.02]
State and local 0.05 0.06 −0.09 −0.11 −0.14 −0.12 0.04 0.06
government spending (0.12) (0.11) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.12) (0.11)
share [0.40] [0.50] [−0.48] [−0.55] [−0.67] [−0.60] [0.41] [0.56]
Labor growth −0.07 0.08 0.31 0.68 0.39 0.61 −0.05 −0.03
rate (0.56) (0.54) (0.64) (0.69) (0.68) (0.68) (0.52) (0.52)
[−0.13] [0.14] [0.48] [0.98] [0.58] [0.89] [−0.11] [−0.06]
D(Log(Private 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.13
physical capital (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
investment)) [3.86] [3.75] [3.59] [3.26] [3.30] [3.29] [5.14] [5.15]
D(Openness) 0.52 0.14 0.83 0.40
(0.40) (0.41) (0.51) (0.54)
[1.29] [0.34] [1.63] [0.73]
D(Average −1.46 −0.43 −1.13 −0.51
tariff rate) (1.16) (1.25) (0.91) (0.90)
[−1.26] [−0.35] [−1.24] [−0.57]
Inﬂation rate −0.48 −0.50 −0.46 −0.51
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
[−3.20] [−3.50] [−3.25] [−3.60]
D(Log(Price of −0.13 −0.12 −0.14 −0.13
energy)) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
[−2.33] [−2.12] [−2.43] [−2.24]
D(Gini) −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
[−2.47] [−1.96] [−1.78] [−2.78]
Adjusted R-squared 0.41 0.49 0.34 0.41 0.37 0.42 0.46 0.54
Number of observations 42 41 37 34 35 34 46 43
Notes: Dxt D xt −xt−1. Standard errors and t-statistics are given in parentheses and brackets, respectively.
OLSDordinary least squares.
Table 1. With two levels of government, federal and the combined state
and local governments, only one spending share is included in the regres-
sion because of the adding-up property. We have included the spending
share of the combined state and local governments as a measure of ﬁscal
decentralization; a higher level of the combined share indicates a higher238 xie, zou, davoodi
degree of ﬁscal decentralization. Results in Table 2 show that the estimated
coefﬁcients for the combined state and local spending share have mixed
signs and are highly insigniﬁcant, further indicating that the existing ﬁscal
structure in public spending has been consistent with growth maximization.
Other variables in Table 2 have the same signs as in Table 1.
4. CONCLUSION
The main objective of this paper has been to provide theory and evi-
dence on the relationship between ﬁscal decentralization and growth. In
a simple model of endogenous growth with public spending by different
levels of government, we have demonstrated how ﬁscal decentralization af-
fects the long-run growth rate of the economy. Applying the model to the
U.S. economy, we ﬁnd that the existing spending shares for local and state
governments are consistent with growth maximization. This ﬁnding holds
for two as well as three levels of government. Our empirical examination
is highly relevant for current policy debates on the allocation of federal
grants and the assignment of expenditure responsibilities among the three
levels of government in the United States. If efﬁciency gains and growth are
the main objectives for further ﬁscal decentralization in the United States,
the empirical results of our study seem to suggest that this move may be
harmful for growth.
DATA APPENDIX
The following data sources are used in this paper: Economic Report of
the President (ERP), Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial
Times to 1970 (HSUS); Historical Abstract of the United States (HAUS);
National Income and Product Accounts of the United States , Volumes
I and II, 1929–1988 (NIPA); Survey of Current Business (SCB); Facts and
Figures on Government Finance (FFGF); Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS);
Current Population Reports (CPR).
The variables as well as their sources used in this paper are civilian la-
bor force (ERP; HSUS); population (ERP); imports and exports (ERP);
gross domestic private investment (ERP); gross domestic product (ERP);
consumer price index or inﬂation (ERP); total duties calculated and total
imports for consumption (HSUS;HAUS); federal government expenditure,
state and local government expenditure (NIPA;SCB); state government di-
rect expenditure, local government direct expenditure (HAUS;FFGF); fed-
eral grants-in-aid to state and local governments, federal government re-
ceipts, state and local government receipts (NIPA;SCB); labor quality index
or labor (BLS); price of energy (HSUS;HAUS;SCB); the Gini coefﬁcient
(CPR).
The data used in this study are available from the authors upon request.ﬁscal decentralization and the economy in the u.s. 239
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